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BRIEF OF A PPEI ,1 ANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an act: on wherei n the Respondents souqhf udgment 
aga . -. ? ,- : - * :-*" • " ' hem 
durinq a period <,f redemption. • oilowinq sheriff's sale. ri---
Respondents were the purchasers at the sheriff's sale and the 
Appell ai its w < M: e the owners O' ; ;e property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Fifth Judicial District court, by and +" -< i 
Honorable J- Harlan Burns, Judge, set a trial date > n t.nt. case, 
which trial .:at^  was oroperly objected t by *-he Apt^ll irfs. 
Without iu* ' » • v* •" " r -ct edvJ 
to hear th<- matter ,^id ordered judgment entered against the 
Appellants. Thereafter Appellants caused to be filed a motion 
to set aside the default, which motion was referred to the 
Honorable Robert Owens, Judge Pro Tern, of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court, and denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek a reversal of the order denying the 
setting aside of the Appellants1 default and an order remanding the 
matter for trial on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellants were the owners of a leasehold in Iron County 
State of Utah, upon which they operated a service station. They, 
along with others, were indebted to the Small Business Administra-
tion of the United States of America, which indebtedness was not 
paid when due and judgment was taken accordingly. Thereafter, 
writ of execution was issued and the leasehold was sold at 
sheriff's sale. 
The Respondents, Sterling Griffiths and Donna Griffiths, his 
wife, purchased the leasehold interest at the sheriff's sale for 
the sum of $10,100.00. The Appellants remained in possession of 
the subject real property as owners thereof during the six month 
redemption period pursuant to law. Respondents, on or about the 
27th day of January, 197 5, commenced an action against the 
Appellants, which aiaong other things requested that the Appellants 
be compelled to pay reasonable rental value of the leasehold 
interest during the redemption period (R- 1 ). On or about the 
13th day of February, 197 5, the Appellants caused an answer to be 
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filed wherein they denied that the Respoi idents were enti tied to 
iir,y r^n+- t'R-' ' . Thereafter, Respondents filed an amended 
•^ '-.r-A.^ xi. <U * i tebruarv, 1975, (R-5) and 
on Marrl- 4, I 9 , S
 r Appellants ftl*-d an answer to the amended 
complaint (R-13). 
On or about T. . id tin 1 , , I1'1' • • - '-di MM i 
hearing in -he district Court nf the Firth Judicial District :,n and 
for T ror . -,- '-i^ie oi utdi) Appellants1 '-^unsoi was informed 
that * he matter had been set f ,c • r * .i • —t , 
\ ;^/S thereafter >r M U l";th day Jnl:, , 1 ^  ? ;, Appellants' 
- -wis* 1 . :. "^ -c t . ' - 5'-. . "'>i;-fy Clerk an <--t*iection 
to the trial s e t t r m {R-l1)), ' n i s , t'lr-'tit J, vas based upc- * IP 
fact that: Aop<~ M a? *-•- J -r^le counsel had .;e^n previously scheduled 
+-o appear . ? *M - -. • * . t;" < •• " • *- '5a It Lake 
County, State of Utah, 
Durinq tin; remainder of the r^ontn o f 'uly ,*nd through the 
month of August, 1975, no law and motion d.'> Fi fth 
Judicial District Court, and Appellant? ' mo* .or. * i^ rike t ne 
trial date did uot *- • • ' *a* • : beforr +-^e nnur \ the 
2nd day of Septembei - J97", u - T.at '. x was raii^c • -» 
Respondents appeared in person and with their attorney, an<: 1 nc 
Appellants wt'ic IK.<1 , ; *. viii nur was f hi - i'-.sei iR-jo;. 
The Court ordered stru 'K thf* in* w*-r • i tne Appellant* and 
took ta^4 .--. '•/ -<*rv* - • - •»- reasonable rental -nine of • h* 
property, Hid ^nterea i .»< defaui s *• . i 
Appellants' attorney was thereafter informed of this procedure, 
and on or about the 5th day of September, 197 5, filed a motion to 
set aside the default judgment entered by the Court (R-21). An 
order was submitted to the Honorable J. Harlen Burns, Judge of 
the Fifth Judicial District Court, to set aside the default judgmen 
entered on the 2nd day of September, 1975, and the Judge started to 
sign the order and then did not complete the same (R-26). 
Thereafter, at the request of Appellants, the matter was 
referred to the Honorable Robert Owens, as a Judge Pro Tern, and the 
matter was submitted to the Judge on memorandum. The Judge, on or 
about the 17th day of March, 197 6, entered his order denying the 
motion to set aside the default judgment (R-32). It is from this 
order that Appellants have sought this appeal. It is interesting 
to note that notwithstanding the fact that judgment was granted by 
the District Court on or about the 2nd day of September, 1975, to 
date no judgment has in fact been presented to the Court for entry. 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
(A) A judgment by default is granted when a party fails 
to defend, even when testimony is taken and received by the Trial 
Court. 
The Trial Court, in its memorandum of opinion (R-3 2) 
attempts to make Appellants' failure to appear a trial on the 
merits rather than a default judgment. Rule 55(a) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
"When a party against whom a judgment for 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead 
or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and 
that fact is made to appear, the clerk shall enter 
his default." (Emphasis added) 
In the case before the Court, the Appellants did not defend 
because they were unable to defend. Counsel for the Appellants 
had already been scheduled for a court appearance in another 
court, of which fact the Court had been previously advised (R-19)» 
The Trial Court proceeded with the matter and awarded judgment even 
though the Appellants were not afforded the opportunity to defend. 
Even when testimony is taken, the judgment granted when the other 
party does not or cannot defend is a judgment by default. Rule 55 
(b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part: 
"• . .the court may conduct such hearings or order 
such references as it deems necessary and proper." 
The Trial Court in this matter did proceed in this matter, taking 
testimony from one of the Respondents, after which it entered 
judgment for the Respondents (R-38). The testimony offered is 
that of what a reasonable rental of the premises were, and that 
appears to be what the award of judgment was upon. The meritorious 
claims of the Appellants were not even mentioned. Rule 55(b) (2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure appears to be aimed at this 
type of testimony for awarding a judgment. If the Court had taken 
testimony as to the claims of the Appellants, then a trial on the 
merits might have been proper. But in this matter, where they 
did not have a proper opportunity to defend and no testimony was 
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taken as to their claims, a judgment upon the merits was not 
granted but rather a judgment by default. 
At the present time, no findings of fact and conclusions 
of law or decree or order of judgment have been prepared, signed 
or entered in this matter. It would seem that since there have 
been no specific findings in this matter, a judgment by default 
and not a judgment upon the merits has been awarded to Respondents. 
After a defendant has affirmatively pleaded and then failed 
to appear to substantiate his case, it has been held that the court 
may then enter a default judgment against him. Schooler v. 
Asherst, 11 Ky (1 Litt) 216 (1822). 
In the case before the Court, the Appellants did not fail 
to appear, but rather they were precluded from appearing because 
their counsel had to be in another court at the same time as this 
trial, which matter had been set prior to the time of trial in 
this matter. 
Also, in Peterson v. Crosier, 29 U. 235, 81 P. 860 (1905) 
a case where the defendant and his counsel did not appear at the 
time of trial at which point the trial court proceeded with the 
action, a judgment by default was granted for the plaintiff and 
not a judgment on the merits. The factual situation in that case 
gives rise to the proposition that even where there is testimony 
taken, if the defendant fails to appear, the judgment granted is 
a judgment by default. Even though the trial court took testimony 
in this case, a judgment by default was granted to the plaintiffs 
and not a trial on the merits. 
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(B) The trial court should have continued this case until 
the counsel for the Appellants could be present. 
A party is not granted a continuance as a matter of right, 
but rather as an act of discretion by the trial court. In Patton 
v. Evans, 92 U. 524, 69 P.2d 969 (1937), the Honorable Court held 
that a motion for continuance or postponment is left to the dis-
cretion of the trial court and where the inability of a party's 
counsel to be present at the time set for trial because he is in 
attendance at another court does not necessarily entitle the client 
to a continuance. The facts under Patton v. Evans, supra, and the 
case before the Court are clearly distinguishable and even using 
the dicta in the Patton case, it is easily determined that a 
continuance should have been granted in this matter. 
In Patton, the counsel for the appellant was engaged in 
another trial in Federal Court when the Patton matter was called 
for trial on March 10, 193 2, a date previously set by the court. 
On March 10, 193 2, an attorney appeared who did not represent the 
appellant's attorney and made oral statements that the attorney 
for the appellant was engaged in the U.S. District Court in 
Ogden, and asked for a continuance of the case before the State 
Court. The jury and all witnesses being present and ready, the 
court denied the motion for continuance and proceeded with the 
trial. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the actions of the trial 
court. However, this Court stated at 69 P.2d 971: 
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M
. . .In the instant case it appears a jury had 
oeen called and it does not appear that counsel 
tor the defendant gave the clerk or the court 
notice of his inability to try the case on the 
morning of March 10th until the venire had already 
arrived. A continuance would have been at the 
expense of the county. There is not reason shown 
why defendant's counsel could not have notified 
the court or the clerk in time to avoid the calling 
of jurymen. The motion was oral and very informal 
by some other attorney representing defendant's 
attorney. There is no objection to this, but 
unless the court chooses to act without formal 
motion, it has the right to have presented an 
affidavit of the reason why counsel cannot try 
his case. Counsel takes the risk when he sends 
an attorney friend to the court to suggest the 
continuance because the latter has been told the 
participating attorney is engaged in another suit. 
Under the circumstances, we see no abuse of 
discretion." 
In the case presently before this Honorable Court, the 
counsel for the Appellants notified the Trial Court within three 
(3) days after receiving notice of the trial setting that he would 
not be able to attend, the reason being that he already had a 
trial at which he must appear on that day (R-19). This took place 
approximately forty-five (45) days prior to the trial date. The 
Trial Court took no action on the objection of the Appellants' 
counsel as to the trial setting, even after contacts by the 
secretary of Appellants' counsel (R-28). The Trial Court did 
not hold any law and motion days between the time when the objection 
was made and the time of trial so that counsel could make his 
objections orally before the Court, and the counsel for the 
Respondents was informed of the conflicting trial of Appellants' 
counsel well ahead of the time of trial. All of these facts, plus 
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the fact that the defendant had only the attorney of record as his 
sole counsel, clearly distinguish this case from the Patton case. 
The Court also stated in the Patton case, at 69 P.2d 971: 
". . .certainly a trial court desiring to be fair 
would, unless there were very important and urgent 
counterconsiderations, not force to trial a case 
where sole counsel was engaged in the trial of 
another case." 
When counsel has made his objections timely, informed all necessary 
parties, and has taken steps necessary to have the trial time 
changed for good cause, all of which are factors present in this 
situation, many courts have held it an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court not to grant continuances in the interest of justice. 
112 ALR 603. 
In cases where the counsel has not acted diligently to 
have the trial changed and then not appeared, other courts have 
upheld the trial court in its refusal to grant a continuance. The 
distinction appears to be the efforts made by the trial counsel 
and the reason for his inability to attend. The facts in this 
case clearly warranted a continuance of the matter, and the Trial 
Court should have continued the matter rather than proceed to 
enter a default against the Appellants. 
POINT II 
UTAH COURTS DO NOT FAVOR JUDGMENTS BY DEFAULT. 
Judgment by default is a very harsh remedy for a trial 
court to use when there are legal and factual issues in dispute 
as there are in the present case. As was noted in the case of 
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Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 U.2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962): 
"Judgments by default are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of justice and 
fair play. No one has an inalienable or constitu-
tional right to a judgment by default without a 
hearing on the merits. The courts in the interest 
of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a 
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the 
merits." at 377 P.2d at 190. 
The Appellants have not had an opportunity to present 
their claims. The Trial Court took no action on the objection to 
trial setting of the Appellants, but proceeded to give the 
Respondents judgment after determining what a "reasonable" rental 
of the property was. The Trial Court did not attempt to protect 
any interest of the Appellants. In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 U. 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), the court stated in weighing 
the considerations given to each side where a default judgment is 
sought to be vacated: 
". . .on the other hand, the court is anxious to 
protect the losing party who has not had the 
opportunity to present his claim or defense. 
Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of 
justice and the court will incline toward granting 
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the 
party may have a hearing." at 260 P.2d 7 43 
The case before the Court is one where justice would 
dictate that the Appellants should be given their day in court. 
As already shown in the facts of this matter, the counsel for the 
Appellants has used due diligence in attempting to resolve the 
problem of the trial setting, and there would have been no 
prejudice to the Respondents in having this matter continued until 
-10-
a time when the counsel for the Appellants could appear. 
In Peterson v. Crosier, 29 U. 235, 81 P. 860 (1905), this 
Court stated in a case which had proceeded to trial where the 
defendant failed to appear, testimony was taken, and then a 
default judgment was entered against defendant which he attempted 
to have set aside on appeal, that: 
" . . .the moving party must show that he has used 
due diligence to prepare and appear for trial, and 
present his defense, and that he was prevented from 
doing so because of some accident, misfortune, or 
combination of circumstances over which he had no 
control. If, however, the record discloses mere 
carelessness, lack of attention, indifference to 
his rights on the part of applicant or his counsel, 
he cannot expect an opportunity to redeem the past." 
at 81 P. 862 
The Appellants have met the requirements as set forth in 
Peterson, supra, which when coupled with equity and the basic 
right of a party to have his side of a case heard, would dictate 
that the Trial Court acted incorrectly in not granting the 
Appellants' motion to set aside the default judgment, and failing 
to give the appellants their day in court. 
As was stated in Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 U.2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965): 
" . . .It is in accordance with our rules, and our 
decisional law, that where a default has been taken 
against a party and there is any justifiable excuse, 
the court, should be indulgent in setting aside the 
judgment to afford him an opportunity for a trial 
on merits, and any doubt should be resolved in favor 
of doing so." at 402 P.2d 705 
The Appellants in this matter had a justifiable excuse in 
not appearing and since there was doubt as to what the Court 
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should do about the objection to the trial setting of the 
Appellants and there were definite conflicts of fact and law 
which the Court needed to resolve, this Court should reverse the 
Trial Court and let a trial upon the merits proceed rather than 
allowing a default judgment. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS HAVE A VALID DEFENSE TO PRESENT BECAUSE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RENTS FROM THE 
APPELLANTS DURING THE PERIOD OF REDEMPTION. 
The Respondents appear to be relying upon Rule 69(f) (6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads in part as follows: 
"The Purchaser, from the time of sale until the 
redemption, and the redemptioner, from the time of 
his redemption until another redemption, is entitled 
to receive from the tenant in possession the rents 
of the property sold or the value of the use and 
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits 
have been received by the judgment creditor or pur-
chaser or his or their assigns, from the property 
thus sold preceding such redemption, the amount of 
such rents and profits shall be a credit upon the 
redemption money to be paid;" 
This above-quoted section is identical to 104-37-37, Revised 
Statutes of Utah (1933), which was interpreted in Local Realty Co. 
v. Lindquist, et ux, 96 U. 297, 85 P.2d 770 (1938). 
The issue involved in Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, supra, 
was whether the owner-mortgagor who was in actual possession of 
real estate from the time of sale under mortgage foreclosure to 
expiration of the redemption period was liable to the mortgagee-
purchaser at the sale for the rental value of the premises 
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during the redemption period. The Utah Supreme Court held that 
a purchaser at an execution sale has no right to possession of 
the property until such time as the redemption period has 
expired, and that the judgment creditor in possession of the 
property is not chargeable for rent during the redemption period. 
At 85 P.2d 775, the Court states: 
"'An execution creditor is not entitled to possession 
and rents of the property levied upon, before sale, 
and before the time for redemption has expired.1 
It is clear and undoubted that the judgment debtor 
is, in contemplation of law, the owner of the 
property during six months allowed for redemption 
and that he has a right to its use and occupation. 
We note briefly three other reasons why the owner 
in possession should not be chargeable with rents 
during the redemption period." (Emphasis added) 
The Court then goes on to explain other reasons why the owner in 
possession shouldn't be chargeable during the redemption period 
for rents. 
The Respondents in this matter are attempting to obtain 
rents from the Appellants who were the owners of the leasehold 
of the property in question and also were the owners in possession 
of the property. 
In properly applying Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, supra, 
The Appellants do not have to pay rents to the Respondents during 
the redemption period, as a matter of law, yet the trial court 
granted the Respondents a judgment for rents during the redemption 
period. Such a ruling being contrary to the established law of 
this State, should be reversed. The Respondents, as noted in 
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Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, supra, can only claim title to the 
property upon the execution of a sheriff's deed or some other 
conveyance, and until such title, they have no real interest in 
the property except the right to obtain a deed to the property 
if the property is not redeemed within the time period. It 
should be noted in passing that the assignees of the Appellants 
have in fact redeemed the property from Respondents. The 
Respondents in this case should not be entitled to any rents and 
the Trial Court's decision to grant such rents should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that based upon the foregoing 
this Honorable Court should enter its order reversing the denial 
of Appellants1 motion to set aside the default, and order that 
the matter be remanded for a trial on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Attorney for Appellants 
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